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Those interested in the history of inter-service disputes between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are presented with an embarrassment of riches.​[1]​  This relationship has from the very start journeyed through rough waters – and, to be properly balanced, stormy skies.  The most notorious and bitter periods of the conflict were in the interwar years and then again in the mid-1960s.  In both of these eras, the intensity of the struggle and the perceived significance of the issues at stake for one or both services were so great that the conflict flowed over the walls of discretion surrounding Whitehall to impact on the public consciousness.  In fact, there is more continuity in the relationship than this depiction would suggest.  The early and mid-1950s saw a remarkable level of bureaucratic infighting and political skulduggery that is all the more striking for not spilling over into the public arena.  Similarly, the disputes were by no means put in abeyance during the Second World War.  While there was a great deal of very effective cooperation between the services, particularly at the level of those conducting operations, the relationship at the top of the hierarchy was anything but harmonious.  There were many, serious clashes between the leaderships of the two services, which perhaps do not get the attention they deserve due to being eclipsed by the comforting knowledge that the result was victory.  Perhaps the most enduring as well as the most significant concerned the allocation of aircraft between the competing claims of the strategic air offensive and the campaign against the U-boats.

This article examines this wartime argument between the two services and explores the reasons underlying it.  It begins with a brief overview of the parallel development of the two campaigns, to provide a broad chronology and to set the analysis that follows in its wider context.  It then summarises the conceptual background and the central contention of the interwar air theorists, that the proper use of air power lay in bombing the heart of the enemy’s power, which would by itself bring victory.  It argues that the Royal Air Force was fixated on implementing this approach during the Second World War, and held to it tenaciously despite the shortcomings that rapidly became apparent.  The article explores in some detail the attempts of the Admiralty to secure additional aircraft for the war at sea and the resistance of the Air Ministry to providing them at the expense of the strategic air offensive against Germany.  The focus is on the issue of transferring aircraft from Bomber Command to Coastal Command; the related issue of the effectiveness of Bomber Command when it was used in the war at sea is unfortunately beyond the scope of what is already a long article.  Finally, it examines the failure of the government and in particular of Winston Churchill (who combined the roles of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence) to mediate effectively on this vitally important question.

This subject has received a growing amount of attention in the academic literature.  John Buckley argues that the inability of Coastal Command to perform the role allocated to it, as a result of interwar neglect by both the Air Ministry and the Admiralty, brought Britain close to disaster between 1940 and 1941.  During the war, he suggests, the Admiralty, which had previously been confident that the U-boat problem had been resolved, quickly realised the vital role for land-based maritime air power but their efforts to get it committed were blocked by the focus of the Air Ministry on strategic bombing.  This policy choice, exacerbated by the policies of the US services, brought about a second, entirely avoidable crisis between 1942 and 1943.​[2]​  Marc Milner is one of many historians who identify the mid-Atlantic air gap as the key problem in winning the campaign, going so far as to state that ‘The failure of the Allies to close the air gap before 1943 remains one of the great unsolved historical problems of the war’.  He notes that closing it required Very Long Range (VLR) aircraft and argues that but for misplaced priorities, these could have been provided earlier.​[3]​  Richard Goette – who identifies a general lack of attention to the issue of maritime air power in the literature on the Battle of the Atlantic – argues that the crisis caused by the air gap ‘could and should have been avoided’.  He continues, ‘the British had the resources to close the air gap in 1942, but they failed to do so.  This was a clear failure of Britain’s military and political leadership’.​[4]​  John O’Connell also concludes that the campaign could have been won a year earlier, in 1942, if the RAF had allocated the B-24 Liberators it acquired from the US.​[5]​  Even historians who approach the subject area from a perspective more sympathetic to air power tend to acknowledge that the Air Staff might have been wrong in its attitude towards the campaign against the U-boats.  Malcolm Smith accepts this point,​[6]​ and Richard Overy writes, ‘Why the RAF remained resistant for so long to the idea of releasing bombers to work over the ocean defies explanation.’​[7]​

There is therefore some degree of consensus that the decisions made in British interwar and, in particular, wartime policy created huge problems for the battle of the Atlantic which were by no means inevitable.  The main issue is therefore to understand why this was the case.  Some recent work has sought to explain why British policy took the shape that it did.  Duncan Redford considers the balance in British policy between the bombing campaign and the Battle of the Atlantic, arguing that it was weighted too heavily towards the former.  He explains this imbalance as being the result of wider strategic and alliance concerns – including the US brand of inter-service rivalry – and also the corporate culture of the RAF.​[8]​  Christopher Bell adds that Churchill’s role in the shortfalls of aircraft for the battle of the Atlantic has generally been overlooked, partly because the great man’s own memoirs draw a veil over it whilst also giving the impression that his concern over shipping losses was greater than it actually was.  In practice, often swayed by Lord Cherwell, he instinctively sided with the Air Ministry over the Admiralty and also the War Office.  While he never wholly swallowed claims that bombing could win the war alone, he was prepared to give the airmen the priority they demanded, over the needs of the Battle of the Atlantic.​[9]​

This article aims to explore more deeply the failure to provide the aircraft which, it is generally acknowledged, were urgently needed for the maritime campaign yet were not forthcoming.  It identifies as the key factor the core ideology of the Royal Air Force which led it to focus on strategic bombing to the exclusion of properly resourcing other, equally valid roles for air power.  It argues that the Air Staff – including Portal, its Chief – was excessively focussed on demonstrating that strategic bombing could win the war on its own.  The result was that it was blind to the requirements of Britain’s most vital campaign during the critical period of mid-1940 to early 1943.  At this time the RAF and Churchill had abundant evidence both that the costly strategic bombing campaign was failing to deliver what had been promised, and also that long-range aircraft were desperately needed for the Battle of the Atlantic.  Nevertheless they refused to accept even the small diminution of the effort devoted to the bombing offensive that would have turned the campaign against the U-boats decisively in Britain’s favour.  The article concludes that to characterise disputes such as this one as ‘inter-service squabbling’ risks overlooking the fundamental – and enduring – intellectual differences on which they rest.

Overview: a tale of two campaigns

First, however, a brief overview of the two related and competing campaigns – the struggle against the U-boats and the strategic bombing campaign – will provide some context for what follows.​[10]​  The early stages of the war were in some ways different to what had been anticipated.  There were no air attacks on Britain while the British Expeditionary Force deployed in France found things remarkably quiet, hence the ‘phoney war’ soubriquet.  The use of this term was quite inappropriate to the war at sea, however, where the war was far more intense from the outset.  Fortunately for Britain and the Allied cause Germany was notably ill-prepared for war at sea, her ambitious naval expansion plans assuming that war would begin only in 1944.  German warships were used for commerce raiding, compelling Britain to divert scarce capital ships and causing much disruption to shipping in addition to the vessels they sank.  Moreover, in stark contrast to the hesitancy that characterised the campaign in the First World War, U-boats conducted attacks without warning almost from the beginning of hostilities.  However, on the outbreak of war, Germany only had 39 operational U-boats; production was expanded but with the needs of the land forces still being strongly prioritised, only 13 more were commissioned by April 1940.​[11]​  In contrast to the First World War, Britain adopted a convoy and escort system from the outset (though it was far from comprehensive and most convoys had minimal escorts) – yet also wasted effort and lost valuable warships in supposedly ‘offensive’ patrolling.  During this first phase, as Tarrant put it, the U-boat campaign was ‘little more than a nuisance’ yet it was also just ‘a preliminary skirmish’.​[12]​  Both sides suffered from a lack of preparation, limited initial numbers of platforms, inadequate training, mechanical failures and technological shortcomings.  Both would ascend a steep learning curve, with the balance of advantage shifting repeatedly over the following years as the campaign ebbed and flowed.

For the RAF in particular, the war did not begin as had been expected.  Instead of launching strategic attacks on the enemy heartland, a policy of restraint was pursued in which great care was taken to avoid hitting civilian targets.  This was partly in order to avoid provoking air attack on British cities and partly due to a desire not to alienate neutral opinion, especially in the US.​[13]​  Bomber Command was used for some attacks against the German fleet and for dropping propaganda leaflets.  Coastal Command contributed to the campaign against the U-boats but the degree of focus on strategic bombing in doctrine, planning, development and procurement meant that anti-submarine warfare, one of the key roles of the air power which the RAF insisted it must control in its totality, was gravely neglected.​[14]​

The course of the war took an abrupt turn for the worse from the British perspective with the German invasion of France in summer 1940.  In addition to knocking Britain’s most powerful ally out of the war – alongside several smaller ones – the campaign brought Italy into the conflict on the opposing side as well as allowing the principal adversary to advance to the Channel coast.  With Britain forcibly evicted from the continent, air power inevitably took on a more central role in British strategy.  Strategic bombing became the principal potential means of striking against Germany and putting direct military pressure against it, with the maritime blockade and the use of subversion in a secondary position.  For RAF Bomber Command, now the tip of the spear for British strategy, the gloves were off and the campaign began in earnest, with bombing of industrial targets in the Ruhr beginning in May, though there were also pressing demands to support the Army in France and then to target shipping that could be used in any invasion of Britain.  The RAF thus now had a golden opportunity to indulge its obsession and to make good on all its previous claims.  Two major problems swiftly emerged.  First, to the initial disbelief and growing discomfort of the airmen, the impact of bombing proved to be vastly less than had been claimed beforehand.  Bombers proved far more vulnerable to enemy air defences than anticipated, with daylight bombing swiftly proving to be prohibitively costly while, partly as a result,  their attacks were woefully inaccurate.  Further, German industry and morale both proved to be more resilient targets than had been assumed.  Much of this was the inevitable result of initial teething problems that could be tackled given time and resources.  However, the second problem was that the strategic air campaign was not the only call on Britain’s scare resources.  While the fall of France increased the centrality of strategic bombing to British strategy, it also tipped the balance of the maritime war very strongly against her, vastly increasing the threat to the sea communications on which Britain’s war effort (including any air operations) were utterly dependent.

During the First World War, the U-boat threat had been barely contained despite the advantage of the British Isles acting as a geographical cork in the bottle for the German fleet, severely restricting its access to the Atlantic.  In mid-1940, however, Germany occupied the Channel and Atlantic coasts of France as well as the coast of Norway.  Naturally, it was quick to build submarine bases and air bases in these areas.  The U-boats now enjoyed much easier and safer access to Britain’s maritime lifelines.  Shorter-range vessels could join the campaign while all U-boats could reach their patrol areas more quickly and could therefore spend more time there.  As Germany benefitted from this enormous force multiplier, Britain faced the opposite effect as evacuations from the continent cost many destroyers either sunk or damaged and then precautions against invasion tied down significant numbers of escorts.  The remaining British anti-submarine forces faced a far greater tactical challenge than had been expected; the general confidence – arguably complacence – that Asdic had solved the U-boat problem was blown apart when the attackers adopted the technique of attacking on the surface, at night, when escorts could neither detect them nor match their speed.  At the same time the convoy escorts, pitifully weak at this early stage of the war, were overwhelmed by ‘wolf pack’ tactics, by which U-boats would concentrate before attacking.  Despite the low number of U-boats in service, the period from the summer of 1940 to early 1941 saw the toll of sunk merchant ships rapidly rise during what the U-boat crews labelled the ‘happy time’.  The threat, moreover, was growing as the increased priority given to U-boat production began to have an effect in the rising number in commission

The anti-submarine campaign benefitted from a number of improvements during 1940 and 1941.  Signals intelligence, at first direction finding and then the breaking of naval cyphers for a time helped with evasive routing.  Significant enhancements in the control of shipping and the management of ports allowed Britain to use her merchant tonnage more efficiently.  The number of escorts grew, as did the training and the experience of their British and Canadian crews.  The growing expertise of Coastal Command provided much needed air cover but only relatively close to land, as the Air Ministry strongly resisted the increasingly desperate appeals of the Admiralty (and indeed Coastal Command) to reallocate very long range (VLR) aircraft to the battle of the Atlantic.  The useful impact of these efforts was much reduced by their tendency to push the U-boats further out into the mid-Atlantic air gap, where the medium-range aircraft that the Air Ministry would allow Coastal Command could not reach.​[15]​  As will be explored in more detail below, Bomber Command was periodically ordered to focus on maritime targets but used the considerable latitude it was allowed to interpret such directives so as to allow it to pursue what it saw as strategic bombing in its proper sense rather than be ‘diverted’ to the war at sea.  The Air Ministry declined to attack the U-boat pens while they were being constructed in France (and later had the gall to object to further appeals to bomb them on the grounds that they were too well protected!),​[16]​ arguing that its best contribution to dealing with the U-boat threat lay in bombing the factories making components in Germany.  They maintained this line in the face of abundant evidence that their preferred approach was not having a significant effect.

Grand strategy brought a mixed blessing; Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union dispersed German efforts, yet the costly Arctic convoys to take supplies to the surly and barely co-operative new ally represented a heavy commitment for British naval and maritime air forces.  More helpfully, the diversion of U-boats to the Mediterranean during the last two months of 1941 brought a much-needed respite in the Atlantic; yet on the other hand, between April and December 1941, the number of U-boats in commission more than doubled, to 250.​[17]​  The end of the year, of course, brought the greatest grand strategic twist of the war with the entry of the United States.

The US had its own vocal corps of air power enthusiasts who were just as keen as their British counterparts to seize their moment in the sun.  Their impact during 1942 was limited as their numbers involved in the campaign grew only slowly.  Further, the US Army Air Force insisted on climbing the same painful learning curve as the RAF, discovering for itself the appalling vulnerability of bombers conducting daylight attacks.  Bomber Command, in turn, continued to argue for top priority in resources and, now under the command of Arthur Harris, chafed at any ‘diversion’ from the true path.  Its capabilities improved as ever more four-engined heavy bombers joined the front line and notable advances in technology and technique began to enhance navigation and the accuracy of bombing.  While the British were conducting area attacks against industrial and population areas, the US nominally focused more on precision strikes; in practice, however, the distinction between the two was limited.  The weight of what became the Combined Bombing Offensive grew steadily but results remained distinctly limited, in absolute terms and even more in relation to the bold promises that had been made – and the question of the right allocation of resources remained.

As in the earlier stages of the Battle of the Atlantic, the balance of advantage was mixed.  Despite the shift to belligerent status of the US (whose forces had previously had a far greater involvement in the ant-submarine campaign than was fully consistent with neutrality), 1942 saw the number of merchant ships sunk by U-boats climb dramatically.  In part this was due to the loss of Ultra intelligence for 11 months from February, when a fourth rotor wheel was added to the Enigma machine.​[18]​  It also resulted from the abject failure of the Americans to learn from British experience by introducing convoying or even a coastal blackout, resulting in the U-boats enjoying their ‘second happy time’ off the eastern coast of the US.  Losses could have been worse still but for Hitler shifting U-boats to the Mediterranean and to guard against the phantom menace of an allied invasion of Norway.  Conversely, the formidable US industrial potential began to make itself felt in terms of production of merchant ships and also of escorts and escort carriers – though the Atlantic was by no means the only call for shipping and escorts, with much effort committed to the Pacific or the Mediterranean (notably escort carriers to support the Torch landings).  Bomber Command was not the only service that had grounds for complaints about diversions.

As the US belatedly introduced coastal convoys, the U-boats returned to the mid-Atlantic air gap once again, and in ever increasing numbers – there were in service 358 in August 1942 and then 420 in May 1943,​[19]​ albeit not all operational at once.  Some additional Liberator aircraft were commissioned into Coastal Command, but they were used ‘offensively’ in the Bay of Biscay rather than over convoys where they would have been more effective – in part because they were a later mark of Liberator which lacked the full range of the Mark I.​[20]​  The key problem was the shortage of VLR aircraft in Coastal Command.  Those responsible for protecting sea communications continued to be frustrated by the determined resistance of the Air Ministry to seeing their precious strategic bombing campaign weakened by the small number of VLR aircraft that could have closed the air gap.  Important technological advances assisted the anti-submarine campaign, such as the wider availability of radio direction finding equipment for escorts and for aircraft, Leigh lights on aircraft, better air-dropped depth charges, and an improved, forward-firing depth charge launcher for escorts.  On the other hand, radar receivers helped U-boats avoid air attack.  Similarly in signals intelligence, Britain broke the German cyphers again late in 1942 (only for another gap to emerge in early 1943) but the advantage this provided was offset by Germany benefitting from its own penetration of British signals.  In November 1942 Britain finally decided to increase the allocation of VLR aircraft to Coastal Command.  Putting this decision into practice (which required conversions of Liberators) proved a surprisingly slow business.​[21]​

At the 1943 Casablanca conference the Allies finally made the defeat of the U-boats their top priority, though the strategic air offensive was also retained as a central element of allied strategy.  March 1943 saw some of the highest shipping losses of the war but by the spring various factors and trends finally came together to result in a decisive shift in the balance of advantage.   Ever greater numbers of escorts came into service and were increasingly effective due to radar, countering the advantage enjoyed by U-boats when attacking on the surface at night, and to the improving tactics and growing experience of commanders and crews (while those with experience among the U-boat crews became ever fewer).  More support groups were formed to assist convoys that came under heavy attack and to hunt down the U-boats that were located, while the convoy continued its voyage.  There were improvements in signals intelligence that endured.  Crucially, the much-needed air support at long last became available, belatedly allowing the mid-Atlantic gap to be closed, with the commitment of escort carriers and converted Merchant Aircraft Carriers to Atlantic convoys and also, at last, sufficient numbers of Very Long Range land-based maritime patrol aircraft.  The decisive point in the campaign against the U-boats came in May 1943, when their losses became so high that Donitz temporarily withdrew them from the Atlantic.  This respite was only temporary and further offensives were launched, and the protection of the vast shipping requirements needed for the build-up of US forces in Britain continued to demand considerable resources, but the crisis point had passed.  Major German technological breakthroughs that could have caused far greater problems (notably the ‘schnorkel’ which allowed U-boats to recharge their batteries while submerged) came too late and in too small numbers to have a decisive effect – not least due to the mining campaign of Bomber Command disrupting the training of crews and work-up of new boats.

The strategic bombing offensive continued to enjoy comparatively lavish resources.  During the campaigns of 1943, the leaders of the RAF and USAAF were finally forced to accept that the interwar air theorists had been wrong to believe that, unlike the older services, the air force could ignore its opposite number to concentrate directly on putting pressure on the heart of the enemy’s will and power.  This was no minor correction to air power theory but rather struck at the heart of its ‘offensive’ mantra.  The solution was to pursue true air supremacy; the Pointblank directive of June 1943 made the German fighter force the first priority for the bombing campaign.  The decisive shift came with the advent of long-range fighters capable of escorting the bombers throughout their missions; the German fighters had to give battle and were shot down in increasing numbers.  As command of the air started to become a reality, other developments in navigation and bombing accuracy, as well as better techniques for bombing, improved the impact of attacks.  As Overy put it, ‘During the last year of the war the bombing campaign came of age.’​[22]​  There were still tensions over the priorities for the campaign (with debates continuing to rage over oil production versus transportation targets or population centres).  The bomber forces were to some extent brought to heel and pulled back within Allied strategy to provide broad support for Overlord, ending the remaining hope that strategic bombing could make it at best unnecessary, at worst a mere occupation.  In the closing stages of the war, as it became clear that the resources of the Allies were simply overwhelming Germany, the bombing campaign continued to expand.  ‘In the month of March 1945, for instance, the total tonnage dropped by the Anglo-American air forces was, amazingly, just shy of the total tonnage dropped during the year 1943.’​[23]​

The strategic air campaign eventually inflicted enormous damage and disruption, directly and indirectly eroding the capacity of Germany to wage war.  However, the results were far less in magnitude and far slower to accrue than had been promised by the bombing proponents on either side of the Atlantic.  Moreover, their campaign came at a huge opportunity cost; a very small proportion of the long-range bombers lost over Germany (at a stage in the war when their impact was very limited) could have had a decisive effect on the Battle of the Atlantic.  At first glance, it seems inexplicable that there should be such reluctance to transfer air power from strategic bombing, which was delivering so little, to provide desperately needed support in a campaign that was genuinely critical for Britain’s very survival.  To understand this, we need to consider the conceptual backdrop that created the intellectual baggage that so distorted British strategy.

The conceptual background: bombing to win

The interwar period was a remarkably fruitful one for new ideas about how to wage war.  The experience of the Great War resulted in a widespread conviction that a better way of fighting had to be found.  Conversely, a wide range of new military technologies had seen their major debut during the war, including tanks, submarines and air power.  Although none of these exerted a decisive influence on the course or outcome of the war, their initial uses hinted that much more might be expected if they were used differently.  The result was that a range of thinkers sought to answer the problems of strategy by setting their fertile imaginations to extrapolate the future capabilities of these new technologies.​[24]​  While the conceptual debate raged, the armed forces faced the practical challenge of evaluating the current capabilities of multiple new military systems and – even more exacting – their possible future potential.  This task would have been difficult at the best of times but in this instance was made even harder by the uncertainty over British strategy – what sort of war might be fought, where, against whom? – as well as by financial pressures.  The principal concern of the Royal Air Force was to retain its hard-won status as an independent service in the face of suspicion and even hostility from the two older services.  The desire of the Air Staff to carve out a distinctive niche for the fledgling RAF forged a role in colonial policing and, for major war, in strategic bombing – that is, bombing not conducted in close or deep support of the other services but rather aimed directly at the heart of the enemy war-making potential; not working alongside the other services but operating entirely independently.​[25]​  This latter role in particular rested on theoretical foundations provided by a vocal group of air theorists.  While the views of senior British airmen did not always coincide with those of the air theorists,​[26]​ there was considerable common ground between them especially on the fundamental issue of the ability of strategic air power to win wars alone and hence the need to focus on strategic bombing as far as possible to the exclusion of other roles.​[27]​

For the air theorists in Italy, Britain and the United States, the navy was a particular target for their polemics.  Their arguments and the challenge they posed to navies lay on three different levels of strategy.​[28]​  First, at the tactical level, it was argued that aircraft could always and easily locate warships, which would then be helpless targets for attack.  Aircraft carriers (always the subject of bitter criticism since they represented the dangerous heresy of air power not controlled by the air force) were dismissed out of hand on the grounds that their aircraft would inevitably be inferior to land-based aircraft.  Second, at the operational level of warfare, the air theorists argued that land-based aircraft could more effectively and more efficiently perform the traditional roles of the navy, from countering the enemy battlefleet to protecting against invasion.  There might in the short term be some areas where land-based aircraft could not reach, where navies temporarily retained a residual role but these were shrinking and would soon vanish.  Finally, at the strategic level, the central proposition of the interwar air enthusiasts was that air power was not best used in support of the navy and army against their counterparts on the enemy side.  Rather, it should be used from the outset of the war against the heart of the enemy’s military and industrial strength.  The advantage in air warfare lay with the offensive rather than the defensive; command of the air would be gained quickly and would then allow rapid victory by destroying the will and ability of the enemy to fight. The logical result of this principle was that there was little or no need to devote resources to the older services, who could not operate without dominant air power and were not really necessary with it.​[29]​  These multi-level challenges to the ability of – and even need for – the navy to perform its traditional roles set the stage for what was to follow.

The central claim of the interwar air theorists was that offensive action (bombing the enemy’s air bases and the factories producing his aircraft) would swiftly gain command of the air, which could and should then be exploited to shatter his will and ability to continue fighting.  This point bears emphasis: they were not, as is often suggested, simply predicting that air power would be important in future war – this claim would be so self-evident as to be banal.  Their hypothesis was more specific and far more ambitious, namely that air power properly used would on its own bring rapid and low-cost victory, obviating the necessity to accept the costly slogging matches entailed by fighting at sea or on land.  There would be no need to undergo the slow and exhausting process of waiting for the naval blockade to bite or for the army to painstakingly push back the opposing army inch by bloody inch.  Unlike the older services, air forces were not compelled to undergo the time-consuming attrition of their enemy counterpart; rather they could immediately and directly attack the heart of his power and thereby win the war.  For the Royal Air Force, just as for the interwar air theorists, strategic bombing was the unique selling point of air power.  This role, and its corollary of an independent, centralised air force owning everything that flies, went to the very heart of its institutional identity and was the centrepiece of its claim to exist as a single service.  The vision of the interwar theorists was taken up by the leaders of the RAF for whom strategic bombing became more than a matter of policy or doctrine – it seems to have resembled something between ideology and theology, an article of faith that transcended reason.  It would be unfair and inaccurate to impute to the RAF leadership (which in any case contained a range of opinions) the more ludicrous excesses of all the theorists.  However, the two groups had a great deal in common in terms of the direction of travel, even if they differed in terms of just how far down the road they went.  Not all senior airmen believed that bombing alone could win the war and many moderated their views in the light of experience; however, the conviction that it was possible and the aspiration to make it a reality were sufficiently widely held in the Air Staff for long enough to have a decisive and highly detrimental impact on wartime strategy.

Theory into reality: the strategic air offensive and victory

According to the RAF Air Historical Branch, at the start of the war the air force expected that the strategic offensive ‘would produce significant and perhaps even decisive results within six months’.​[30]​  The core belief that strategic bombing would produce victory appears time and again in Air Ministry papers.  The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal stated in May 1941: ‘At the moment therefore we are working to a clear strategic plan.  We aim to win the war in the air, not on land.  Undoubtedly, we must build up land forces as well within the priorities already assigned but as far as the Continent is concerned these forces will be used as an Army of Occupation after the bombing offensive has crushed the enemy’s will to resist.’  Before British land forces returned to the continent, he argued, ‘there is one indispensable prerequisite, namely, that the Air Force as a whole must establish decisive air superiority, and that the Bomber Force in particular must cripple the enemy’s will to resist.’​[31]​  He repeated the point the following month: ‘The war can only be won by the development of our air offensive on a scale which, together with the effects of economic pressure and propaganda, will break the German will to continue fighting.’​[32]​  Portal’s biographer denies that he believed the war could be won by bombing alone and praises his ‘balanced outlook’​[33]​; as will be shown below, his approach to the war at sea tends to contradict this sympathetic assertion.  General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was clear where Portal’s views about strategy lay: ‘Spent afternoon in the office battling with Portal’s latest ideas for the policy of conduct of this war.  Needless to say it is based on bombing Germany at the expense of everything else.’​[34]​  Again: ‘A heated COS [Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting] at which I had a hammer and tongs argument with Portal on the policy for the conduct of the war.  He wants to devote all efforts to an intensive air bombardment of Germany on the basis that a decisive result can be obtained that way.  I am only prepared to look on the bombing of Germany as one of the many ways by which we shall bring Germany to her knees.’​[35]​  Portal’s views on the potential of air power might indeed have been more moderate and nuanced, ‘more provisional’ than those of Lord Trenchard or Arthur Harris,​[36]​ but this was not saying a lot: he laid an emphasis on strategic bombing that was every bit as overwhelming and single-minded as might be expected of a former head of Bomber Command.

From the very beginning, however, the British air offensive ran into the sort of practical difficulties that the interwar theorists had overlooked.  Numerous and deep flaws in the theory became apparent, not least an exaggeration of the accuracy and destructive power of bombing, a massive underestimation of the potential of air defence, a surprising neglect of issues relating to targeting, and the assumption that command of the air would be swiftly achieved.  In practice, the campaign was initially constrained for fear of German retaliation; when the bombers were unleashed, their ability to find their targets and to bomb them accurately were far less than had been anticipated and losses were far higher.​[37]​  The impact of bombing on the German war effort was hugely disappointing because its industry was far more resilient than was assumed while its economy proved to have considerable slack which could still be devoted to increased production.  The effects of the air offensive were slower to be felt and much less in magnitude than had been expected: according to its official historians, the damage inflicted on the German economy in 1940-41 was ‘negligible’, while in 1942, ‘some substantial damage was done if not such as had any appreciable effect on war production’.​[38]​  Although it would eventually show marked improvement, at no point in the war did it meet the claims of the interwar enthusiasts or the promises of the airmen.  Strategic bombing was not a quick way to win wars on its own; rather it would be one more means of exerting pressure on the enemy alongside more traditional campaigns – it was not a revolution, simply one additional technique to use.

Judged against the bold predictions made on its behalf, the strategic air offensive was a great disappointment.  At times, even Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who found the concept singularly attractive, showed signs of doubt.  When told by Portal in 1941 that four months of focussed attacks could end production in Germany’s 17 main oil plants, he remarked that he ‘was sceptical of these cut and dried calculations which showed infallibly how the war could be won’, such as claims earlier that attacks on the Ruhr would ‘shatter the German industry… but there had only been a fractional interruption of work in the industries of the Ruhr’.  Yet Portal insisted that ‘the forecasts made were not unduly optimistic’.​[39]​  A few months later, the Chief of the Air Staff had to admit that: ‘Oil targets were not so vulnerable as had previously been supposed and there had been difficulty in attacking them during the summer months’, that ‘experience showed that oil targets were difficult to find on any but very good nights of which there might be only three or four in a month’.​[40]​  The inaccuracy of bombing led to a shift in rationale towards a greater emphasis on morale, which had been a major theme of the interwar theorists.  In one of his occasional Olympian missives to the Prime Minister, Lord Trenchard, the godfather of the RAF, advocated morale as a target: ‘All the evidence of the last war and of this shows that the German nation is particularly susceptible to air bombing…  The ordinary people are…virtually imprisoned in their shelters or within the bombed area, they remain passive and easy prey to hysteria and panic without anything to mitigate the inevitable chaos and confusion.  There is no joking in the German shelters as in ours’.​[41]​  Yet experience would show the German population to be no more wobbly under bombing than the British had been.

Despite the failure of the strategic offensive to achieve the promised results, Britain persisted with it.  For the RAF leadership, it was their big chance for the service to make its mark as a war winner.  It was equally attractive to the political leadership.  Having been brutally pushed out of the continent and with no realistic prospect of an imminent return, it seemed to offer perhaps the only opportunity to take offensive action against Germany.  This was of some value in the longer term strategic balance and of even greater importance as a boost to morale at home and to impress the Americans, showing that the country was hitting back.  After the German invasion of the Soviet Union it also became a significant way to provide concrete military support to the hard-pressed Russians, a useful placatory card to play in the face of ever more strident demands for a second front.  So despite the poor return, ever more resources were poured in to the campaign.  It was always given another chance, with more aircraft and a different set of targets; success was always just around the corner and despite his occasional scepticism, Churchill kept returning to the irresistible promise of a shortcut to victory,​[42]​ which the Air Staff was happy to keep offering him.  It is difficult not to sympathise with the motivations of those airmen who had embraced strategic bombing in the hope of avoiding a repeat of the trench warfare they had witnessed in the Great War.  However, there is considerable irony in the way that they lapsed into the same patterns of behaviour of the generals that they criticised: in both cases senior officers clung to their faith in a particular approach, repeatedly doing the same thing only on a larger scale and at higher cost.  In both cases, there was, over time, a huge attritional effect on the enemy.  The problem was that the attrition affected Britain too, and there were other calls on resources that might have earned a better return.

This was the point where the hopes of theory hit the brick wall of reality: once strategic bombing could not provide the promised rapid victory, Britain was compelled once again to face the sordid reality of also fighting traditional campaigns on the sea and on the land, both in order to prevent defeat and to provide further avenues for putting military pressure on the enemy – and these campaigns would also require the support of air power.  The question was not therefore simply whether it was worth pressing on with the strategic bombing campaign, but rather the extent to which it should enjoy priority in resource allocation over other needs.

In part, this debate concerned production and manpower for the RAF as opposed to the Navy and the Army, but it also extended to the allocation of RAF resources between the strategic bombing campaign and the various competing uses of air power.  The leading interwar theorists had seen any suggestion that air power should be used in support of land or naval forces as a dangerous and wasteful diversion of effort.  Douhet, for example, insisted that these ‘auxiliary uses’ of air power were ‘worthless, superfluous and harmful’: without command of the air, they could not achieve anything; with command of the air, they would be pointless; and devoting effort to them would detract from and perhaps jeopardise the effort to gain command of the air.​[43]​  This issue was the biggest gap between the ideas of the theorists and the senior airmen who led the RAF during the war.  Significant effort was devoted to the air defence of Britain, to support of the Army and the Navy and – as will be discussed below – to Coastal Command.  However, the attachment to strategic bombing at the top of the RAF was considerably greater than its achievements merited with the result that the allocation of resources was skewed and the other, equally vital roles for air power were slow to receive the attention that they deserved.​[44]​

To be clear, the strategic bomber offensive did achieve a great deal, in slowing the increase in German war production; in causing the diversion to air defence of many fighters, guns and men that would otherwise have been deployed elsewhere; in the psychological boost it provided to the home front; in helping the Allies to gain air supremacy; and then in the direct disruption it caused to oil production and transport (albeit achieved in the face of determined resistance from the bomber barons to such ‘panacea’ targeting).  However, these very real and very significant accomplishments were not only much less than had been promised and much slower to appear, they also came at a huge cost in blood and treasure – not least, in the opportunity cost of what those resources might have achieved in other areas.  If it is appropriate to consider the wider benefits of the strategic air offensive, then it is equally appropriate to count the wider costs, which include Coastal Command aircrew who died in obsolescent aircraft and many merchant ships, their crews and cargoes – as well as lost warships and lost opportunities that might have been available had the Fleet Air Arm not been so starved of resources or had better shore-based support been available to the Navy.  (Perhaps the principal ethical dilemma concerning strategic bombing should not be seen as the hoary debate over bombing enemy civilian targets, but rather the obstinate refusal of the RAF leadership to ‘divert’ a relatively tiny number of long-range aircraft from largely ineffective attacks over Germany to maritime operations, where they could have prevented the needless sacrifice of so many sailors, ships and cargoes.)  It is at least possible to question whether some proportion of the resources devoted to the strategic air offensive between 1941 and 1943 might have been better directed to other ends.

The airmen make their case

Trenchard, in another epistle to the Prime Minister that was circulated to the War Cabinet in August 1942, set out the case for focussing strongly on the air offensive.  ‘Once a major plan has been decided on in war,’ he wrote, ‘nothing should be allowed to interfere with it or to divert elsewhere the means of carrying it out.  Compromise in war plans is fatal.’  Britain must focus its efforts on the strategic bombing of Germany and not waste air power on other diversions, nor attempt to land in Europe, which ‘is to play Germany’s game – it is to revert to 1914-18.’  He could not have been clearer about the extent to which bombing should be the over-riding priority: ‘The risk is that we shall try to go down two roads and that our Air Power will be inextricably entangled in large schemes and protracted operations of two dimensional warfare…  There is no realisable limit to the power we can achieve in this arm if we concentrate our efforts on a policy which realises what we can do – and do quickly…  We have in our possession the opportunity of producing decisive effects if we realise now that air power has already been proved to be the dominant, deciding and final power in the warfare of today and the future.’​[45]​  The proposition that Bomber Command was the only means to achieve victory was, not surprisingly, asserted strongly by its Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshall Sir Arthur Harris.  In a paper for the War Cabinet, he wrote: ‘To sum up, Bomber Command provides our only offensive action yet pressed home directly against Germany.  All our other efforts are defensive in their nature, and are not intended to do more, and can never do more, than enable us to exist in the face of the enemy.  Bomber Command provides the only means of bringing assistance to Russia in time.  The only means of physically weakening and nervously exhausting Germany to an extent which will make subsequent invasion a possible proposition, and is therefore the only force which can in fact hurt our enemy in the present and in the future secure our victory.’​[46]​  The key themes in these two papers reappeared again and again: only strategic bombing could lead to victory and other uses of air power were dangerous deviations from its proper use; it is striking how often air proponents used loaded terms such as ‘diverted’ or even ‘plundered’​[47]​ – Harris once complained of ‘robbery’​[48]​ – rather than, say, ‘reallocated’.  The Secretary of State for Air joined in this refrain, complaining that the ‘most serious brake in the past on Bomber expansion has been the extraneous commitments’​[49]​ – that is, anything other than the strategic air offensive.

There were a number of problems with this line of argument.  First, it under-rated the fundamental, even predominant importance for the British war effort of the Battle of the Atlantic.  Others on the Chief of Staff Committee were aware of this inescapable reality: ‘the Battle of the Atlantic must at present remain our chief preoccupation: after that our effort should be employed against the most profitable targets in Germany…  The Battle of the Atlantic should have overriding priority.’  Thereafter, there could be a bomber offensive to achieve the air superiority that will be required before operating on the continent, ‘But we must be clear that, before any overriding priority is given to the building of a bomber force to achieve this end, adequate provision must first be made for the security of this country and of those areas overseas which are essential to the maintenance of our war effort.’  It is all more noteworthy that the author of these words was not a naval officer but rather General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.​[50]​  Success in the Battle of the Atlantic was necessary not only for Britain’s survival but also for all military operations – including the air offensive.  In the words of a senior Admiral, ‘It is pertinent here to emphasize that Air Power cannot be exercised if sea communications are cut, as it is by those sea routes that, among other things required by the RAF, come the petrol and oil which allow aircraft to function.’​[51]​

This point draws attention to a related flaw in the Air Ministry case, namely its appropriation for strategic bombing alone of the adjective ‘offensive’.  Only bombing Germany was truly ‘offensive’; all other uses of air power (let alone operations on land or at sea) were pejoratively labelled ‘defensive’ and thus should be demoted way behind in second priority.  This approach was taken particularly with regard to naval campaigns but was also applied to the army.  Thus, after referring to aircraft for cooperation with the navy and army, the Secretary of State for Air wrote, ‘It is, therefore, vital that we should allot the minimum proportion of our resources to the strictly defensive roles.’​[52]​  Portal even went so far in 1941 as to assert that ‘The Army has no primary offensive role.’​[53]​

By this contorted logic, operations aimed by the Royal Navy against enemy forces in their bases would be ‘defensive’ but attacks by Bomber Command against the industrial foundations of the opposing air force were ‘offensive’.  Similarly the campaigns on land in North Africa or at sea in the Mediterranean, where Axis land, naval and air power were ground down, were merely defensive, and any use of air power there was a ‘diversion’ from its proper use against Germany.  In fact, many of the operations that the Navy wished to undertake were ‘offensive’ by any reasonable definition.  The Admiralty repeatedly pointed out that lack of air support in the form of reconnaissance and fighter cover was not only detrimental to the anti-submarine campaign but also hindered its ability to take offensive action against the enemy fleet, to attack his sea communications by blockade, and to support amphibious operations.  Proper air support could also free up capital ships from the Mediterranean for offensive operations against Japan in the Indian Ocean.​[54]​  Heavy shipping losses in the ‘defensive’ campaign against the U-boats also reduced Britain’s ability to transport and supply land and air forces for offensive operations overseas as well as to bring in the fuel that was needed by all branches of the forces, not least Bomber Command.  As one Admiralty paper put it, pointing out that the second front in Europe would require vast shipping support, ‘Every ship that the U-boats can sink is therefore a blow against our offensive strength’.​[55]​  Of course, assisting other services cut both ways: in May 1941, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, sought approval for the carrier HMS Victorious to be released from the (defensive?) role of ferrying RAF fighter reinforcements to the Mediterranean and Middle East: ‘When Victorious had carried her present load of Hurricanes to the Mediterranean they felt it was essential that she should return to her proper role as an offensive weapon against enemy raiders.’​[56]​  The very day that this request was made, the Bismarck was sunk by Royal Navy warships after being slowed by an air strike launched from HMS Ark Royal – which at the time the German battleship put to sea ‘was 1,500 miles away ferrying aircraft to Malta’.​[57]​  Thankfully she was able to switch from a defensive role ferrying RAF aircraft to an offensive role in the war at sea remarkably quickly.

In his paper cited above, Harris described the heavy and medium bombers of Bomber Command as ‘our only offensive weapon against Germany’ – this was written, it should be emphasised, in 1942 – and stated ‘One cannot win wars by defending oneself’.​[58]​  An internal Admiralty paper disputed this statement, suggesting that on the contrary: ‘The history of our country shows that we have often been successful in maintaining a prolonged defensive until the enemy had exhausted himself, and only then turning to the offensive to bring the matter to a conclusion.’  The defence of the UK and protection of sea communications, ‘indicate a strategic defensive, but they should be implemented by offensive tactics.  Although the “Battle of Britain” was part of this defensive strategy it inflicted a very heavy defeat on the enemy’s air force.  The strategic defence of our sea communications inevitably involves destroying the enemy’s armed forces which attack them, while it also allows us to blockade the enemy, which is strategically offensive.’​[59]​  This analysis seems to demonstrate a rather more nuanced understanding of the fluctuating interconnection between offense and defence than appears in bald statements that strategic bombing is offensive and other campaigns are defensive.  It might well be good bureaucratic politics to seek to dominate the terminology used in debates,​[60]​ not least because it was targeted so effectively to appeal to Churchill and his desire to hit back against Germany, yet in this case it was as mendacious a misuse of language as it was bad strategy.

The war over the war at sea

For the Air Ministry, the one priority that eclipsed all others was the strategic offensive against Germany.  This resulted in a determination not to ‘divert’ resources to Coastal Command – which, as we have seen, was dismissed as a merely ‘defensive’ use of air power.​[61]​  The Admiralty consistently pressed for more air power to be allocated to the war at sea.  It is important to be clear what was sought: this was not a request for resources to be switched from producing aircraft for the RAF to building warships for the Navy but rather for production and allocation to shift between two Commands of the RAF, from the one bombing Germany to the one cooperating with the Navy in maritime operations.

This approach was in stark contrast to the antediluvian opinions about the role of air power often attributed to the Navy.  Air enthusiasts liked to claim that the Admiralty did not understand air power, did not value it, sought jealously to keep the naval war to itself.  A few choice quotations could be dredged up from retired officers writing during the interwar period to show what dinosaurs these nautical fellows were.  A fine example would be Bernard Acworth, who was roundly sceptical about air power in general and air power at sea in particular.  In his 1930 book, he wrote that unless seaplanes could be operated from cruisers and battleships, he ‘would advocate the total abolition of aeroplanes from the future British Navy as being, by any other means of employment, of insufficient importance to justify the present disproportionate effort that their utilisation involves.’​[62]​  Digging up such quotations is entertaining but opinions such as his were utterly different to those directing the policy of the Navy – which, indeed, Acworth criticised as being far too air oriented.​[63]​  Such views do not bear comparison with those of the interwar air theorists in terms of their closeness to the official views of the respective services during the Second World War.  Time and again, the Admiralty demonstrated a keen awareness of the value of air power in the war at sea, expressed the belief that the defence of sea communications was now a role for the RAF as well as for the Navy, and sought additional land-based air support for maritime operations.

They could not have been clearer on this point.  In some ways, of course, close cooperation with another service was not new.  As the Second Sea Lord noted, defending sea communications ‘is not and never has been a matter that concerns the Navy alone, although naturally the Navy takes the preponderating role at sea.  Many of the Army’s campaigns in the last 300 years have been fought with the sole object of helping the Navy to obtain and hold command at sea.’​[64]​  A similar partnership was now needed with the RAF.  In the words of the Admiralty Director of Plans: ‘The security of sea communications must be a joint responsibility between the Navy and the Air Force.  Neither, whether in attack or defence, can operate without the other and the two Services are essentially complementary.’  His paper went on to express concern about the attrition that the Navy was facing as a result of ‘the necessity of operating our surface forces in areas where we have inadequate air support against naval forces of the enemy operating in close co-operation with powerful air forces.’​[65]​

This should have been music to the ears of the Air Staff, with the Admiralty abandoning any previous scepticism and now warmly endorsing the role of the RAF in the war at sea.  In some ways, however, their bluff had been called.  Having long proclaimed the willingness of airmen and the ability of land-based air power to take over much of the war at sea, they now faced calls to do so.  Far from being greeted with relief or pleasure, such invitations were evidently most unwelcome.  First, they involved requests to reallocate aircraft from Bomber Command to Coastal Command, particularly the long-range types that were as ideally suited to patrolling distant waters as they were to bombing distant cities.  Second, there were demands to use Bomber Command against targets directly related to the war at sea rather than against the German industrial heartland.  Such proposals seemed to imply that the other services should have a say in how aircraft should be designed and the priorities for aircraft production, as well as in how air power should be used.  These were areas jealously guarded by the Air Ministry as part of the doctrine of central control of all air power by the air force.  In a related concern, they also threatened to compel the Air Ministry to reduce the effort dedicated to strategic bombing, the role that was core to its self-identity as an institution, offering the potential to show they could win the war alone and therefore guarantee a central role for the future.​[66]​  These issues were not treated as minor matters of allocation of assets but rather serious challenges to the institution of an independent air force.

There had been serious blemishes on the Navy’s interwar record of appreciating the potential of air power, both hostile and friendly.​[67]​  If some in the Admiralty had once underestimated either the potential threat or the potential benefits from air power, however, they now proved remarkably fast learners.​[68]​  Unfortunately, their willingness and ability to challenge previously held conceptions and to accept the need for a different approach was not matched by those who clung to the dream of strategic bombing winning the war on its own long after this particular aspiration had been shown to be unachievable and also to have a heavy cost.  During the Second World War, the attitude of the Admiralty was far from sceptical of the potential contribution of land-based aircraft in the war at sea – on the contrary, their complaint was that there was not enough of it.  Time and again the Navy requested that greater RAF effort be devoted to the maritime campaign; time and again they were rebuffed because to do so was not compatible with the focus of the Air Staff on the attempt to achieve their Holy Grail of winning the war through strategic bombing.  As regards the utility of aircraft at sea the problem was not that the Admiralty did not get the principle; rather that, despite repeated efforts, they could not get the aircraft.

As early as November 1940 the Admiralty went to the War Cabinet with a request for an improvement in air support for reconnaissance over North Sea, air patrols against minelayers, and defence against enemy aircraft attacking merchant shipping or guiding in U-boats.  They were not criticising Coastal Command but rather urging that it be better resourced: ‘It is observed that whilst the Coastal Command has given the Navy every possible assistance with the forces at their command, no means of meeting the Navy’s urgent requirements can be within reach on the present Coastal Command strength.’​[69]​  At the meeting that discussed this paper, A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, requested that 15 of the planned 100 new RAF squadrons should be for Coastal Command – hardly a massively disproportionate share – and coined a term that has often been used for this neglected command: ‘They felt that the Coastal Command had always been the “Cinderella” of the Royal Air Force’.  The Secretary of State for Air rejected the Cinderella label and replied that such an allocation would be an ‘undue diversion of aircraft to Coastal duties would hinder the building up of Bomber Command for offensive operations.’  The situation then dramatically worsened for the RAF when Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Aircraft Production) suggested that the Navy should take over control of Coastal Command; his proposal, a great shock to the Air Ministry, got a sympathetic response from Churchill, who knew from his time as First Lord of the Admiralty about the problems with the existing situation: ‘there was no doubt that there would be advantages in having the whole protection of trade under one operational control.  The Coastal Command had not received the scale of equipment that they should have had.’  Portal fell back on the familiar refrain: ‘In principle, all our efforts ought to go towards hitting the enemy and only the bare minimum should go for protective duties.’  Interestingly, the First Sea Lord did not back the proposal, stressing that the urgent need was for short-term assistance which could only come from the Air Ministry.​[70]​

The subject was reconsidered a fortnight later.  Beaverbrook pushed the case hard, arguing: ‘It is not a satisfactory answer to say that the Royal Air Force can fulfil the task of supplementing the surface craft of the fleet.  It has failed to do so.  The Coastal Command of the RAF is quite inadequate.’  The Secretary of State for Air denied that it was starved of resources: ‘The figures showed that there had been relatively a much greater increase in the strength of the Coastal Command than in any other Command of the Royal Air Force.’  (Of course, the fact that an additional 150 aircraft since September 1939 represented a doubling of its strength only showed how small it had been on the outbreak of war.)  The First Lord of the Admiralty and the First Sea Lord made clear their complaints about the existing system, notably their lack of say in design and equipment of the aircraft or the training of the crews that cooperated with the Navy and also that fact that, ‘Although the number of aircraft in Coastal Command is totally inadequate, the Air Ministry can under present arrangements deflect even the small force that exists from its naval purposes without even consulting the Admiralty’.  Yet although they were broadly positive about the proposed change of control – Alexander more than Pound – their support was no more than lukewarm.  The Admiralty representatives made it clear that their concern was rapid expansion, now; thus, they offered to delay the formation of two Fleet Air Arm squadrons for the Mediterranean to equip two land-based, Coastal Command torpedo bomber squadrons in UK – that is, they volunteered to weaken the naval air arm in order to strengthen part of the RAF – and repeated their request that by June 1941, 15 of the 100 expansion RAF squadrons should be in Coastal Command.  Churchill concluded that the change of control might have been desirable in peacetime, but it ‘would be disastrous at the present moment to tear a large fragment from the Royal Air Force’.  The Defence Committee decided that the RAF would retain administrative control of Coastal Command, though operational control should pass to the Admiralty.  The Air Ministry managed to find a number of squadrons of bombers, torpedo bombers and long-range fighters to transfer to Coastal, and promised that they would do what the Admiralty requested and allocate 15 of the 100 new squadrons to Coastal Command; indeed, the Air Ministry ‘will accord the highest priority’ to achieving this by June 1941.​[71]​

Of course, making commitments and fulfilling them were two different things.  In March 1941, the First Lord complained to Churchill: ‘We understand that only 6 of the 15 new operational squadrons promised for Coastal Command have yet been formed and urge all possible acceleration.’​[72]​

Two points emerge from this episode.  First, the Admiralty did not seize this opportunity presented on the initiative of Lord Beaverbrook to push hard for full control of Coastal Command, focussing instead on the practical issue of improving the cooperation provided by the existing arrangements.  After the war, one of the senior civil servants involved recalled that the Chief of the Air Staff and First Sea Lord had agreed with each other on the practical matters involved, while Slessor (in 1940, RAF Director of Plans) commented that the Naval Staff had declined to support ‘this Beaverbrook baboonery’​[73]​ – thereby challenging his own distinctly paranoid view of naval intentions.  Second, it is significant that matters had become so serious that the RAF faced losing one of its commands – its greatest nightmare being dismemberment of this sort – and that it took such a danger to push it to promise more aircraft to Coastal Command, memorably described by Harris as achieving ‘nothing essential to either our survival or the defeat of the enemy’ and being ‘merely an obstacle to victory.’​[74]​  (This description, all the more damaging for appearing in a personal note to Churchill, is less suggestive of cool analysis than of someone in thrall to an obsessive ideology.)

The ongoing dispute intensified during 1942.  Shipping losses to U-boats continued at a high level, the Chiefs of Staff concluding that the result was a ‘very serious situation’ in which Britain could not adequately reinforce the Middle East, India, the Indian Ocean and Far East.​[75]​  A report suggested that from the start of 1942 to mid-1943, there would be a shortage of 8.4 million tons (or 20%) in non-tanker imports.  It concluded that the resulting cut-backs ‘might damage national morale and limit our capacity to carry on the war with full vigour and efficiency’.​[76]​  Ironically, of course, this was just the effect that the British strategic bombing campaign was intended to have on Germany.

Admiral Pound submitted a paper stating explicitly in its opening words the harsh reality that Portal and the Air Ministry refused to acknowledge: ‘If we lose the war at sea we lose the war.’  The requirements he set out for the war at sea included sufficient land-based aircraft that, ‘The enemy, whenever they come within the range of our shore-based aircraft, are subjected to attack by air forces which are at least as numerous, as suitable and as well trained for operations over the sea as are those of our enemies.’  He also identified the need for aircraft to protect convoys and shipping, a torpedo bombing force, and bombing of U-boat yards.  The numbers of aircraft he sought were large but hardly outrageous, including 100 long-range General Reconnaissance aircraft for Home use (250 altogether) and a strike force of 160 aircraft at Home (a total of 390, plus 70 Navy aircraft).  In all, this would amount to 1,940 aircraft.​[77]​  To put this figure in context, the RAF ‘Target Force E’ of June 1941 envisaged a Bomber Command in which heavy bombers alone would number 4,000.​[78]​  The Admiralty was asking no more of the RAF than that it do what it had always claimed it could.  Its request represented a small number of aircraft relative to those the Air Ministry was losing over Germany to arguably less important ends, given the meagre results of the strategic air offensive to this point; as Pound commented to Churchill, ‘If I could get the number of bombers we lose in a few days [over Germany] we could make a great start.’​[79]​  The Air Ministry, however, continued to reject shifting long-range aircraft from Bomber Command to Coastal, arguing that it would be ‘a dispersion of our bombing resources in an attempt to contribute defensively to the control of sea communications over immense areas of oceans where targets are uncertain, fleeting and difficult to hit.’  Better, they argued, to weaken the U-boats by attacking industrial areas in Germany.​[80]​  Again, in the Defence Committee, Portal rejected Pound’s appeal for more land-based aircraft for anti-submarine patrolling, on the grounds that it would mean a ‘considerable reduction in the strength of Bomber Command.  The question was whether the war effort would be best assisted, and the maximum help to Russia given, by maintaining the maximum offensive against Germany or by diverting resources to defensive patrolling over the sea.’​[81]​  Any suggestion that the bombing campaign should give any ground to other needs was anathema to the RAF, which generally had the support of Churchill.  As Brooke put it, ‘With PM in his present mood, and with his desire to maintain air bombardment of Germany, it will not be possible to get adequate support for either the Army or the Navy.’​[82]​

The Air Ministry frequently argued that the problem was not any lack of will to support the maritime campaign but rather a lack of resources – that is, the problem was the shortage of aircraft relative to the many demands on them.​[83]​  There was undoubtedly some justice in this.  Strategists will never have all the resources that they might wish and Britain’s position in the early years of the war was particularly grim.  However, there were still real questions over the allocation of those scarce resources that were available.  The Admiralty commented that they appreciated that there was a general shortfall in aircraft but felt that ‘the effect has fallen rather more heavily on Coastal Command types than on others’.​[84]​  The problem was not, as the Air Staff argued, solely the result of insufficient aircraft; while this was a factor, it was greatly exacerbated by the policy of the Air Staff, which in design and production of aircraft, training of crews and allocation of effort consistently over-emphasised the strategic air offensive at the expense of other commitments.

The First Sea Lord returned to the issue in June 1942, underlining the gravity of the situation, with sinkings averaging over 677,000 tons per month over the previous quarter, while Germany was commissioning 20 new U-boats per month.  In response, Portal not only rejected the plea for more aircraft but even refused the suggestion of a study of the issue by the Joint Planning Staff (which was proposed by Pound but also backed by Brooke).  He offered the extraordinary argument that new production of shipping would shortly rise above the level of sinkings, and that Pound’s paper was ‘not conclusive’ on whether the situation at sea was grave, and ‘unassailable arguments should be forthcoming before a severe curtailment of the air offensive could be accepted’.​[85]​  This approach characterised the debate: hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping lost, with all the wasted resources of building the ships and their cargoes, let alone the deaths of their crews, did not constitute an ‘unassailable argument’ for reconsidering resource allocation, while the most modest transfer of aircraft is ‘a severe curtailment of the air offensive’.  As noted above, such an approach appears to be little different in terms of callous refusal to reconsider assumptions to the tactics of the First World War generals whom the Air Staff were so quick to criticise.​[86]​

As a result of the on-going dispute, the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Home) and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) wrote a joint report.  It began by noting that British strategy had agreed priorities placing ‘Minimum necessary allocations for securing our vital communications and interrupting those of the enemy’ ahead of ‘Maximum possible provision for the offensive, both direct and in support of land operations’.  The ‘minimum necessary’ for sea communications was defined as: ‘Prevent our losing the war by the cutting of our sea supply lines; or suffering unacceptable delay in the development of our capacity to win it by the reduction of supplies, or by the sinking of unfinished war material’.  The compromise report noted that the Admiralty saw the situation at sea as critical, with the number of sinkings ‘a deadly menace’ resulting in waste of war effort and offensive potential.  The Air Ministry, however, perceived the same situation as grave but not critical: ‘a relatively small proportion of our war material is being sunk and no action we can take in the next few months would make a substantial difference to the amount of shipping available for WS [Britain to Suez Canal] convoys in the near future’.  Nonetheless, despite this vastly different appreciation of the situation, the two authors agreed that the planned expansion in Coastal Command would not come fast enough, and so recommended that two squadrons of Lancasters be loaned from Bomber Command for reconnaissance for the fleet and for anti-U-boat patrolling.​[87]​  It is striking that the two officers who thus concluded that the situation at sea was grave enough to merit transferring long-range aircraft from Bomber Command were Rear Admiral E.J.P. Brind and Air Vice-Marshall John C. Slessor, who at other times proved himself to be a fervent believer in the bomber offensive.

The latter’s argument did not go down well with his chief: where the report states that the effects of the bomber offensive ‘are just as much open to speculation as those of the blockade’, the copy stamped ‘CAS PERSONAL COPY’ has the pencil annotations, ‘No’ and ‘Rot’.​[88]​  Slessor defended the proposal in a briefing to Portal, arguing that although Britain was not in danger of losing the war due to the shipping situation, ‘I do not feel that we can allow the present rate of sinkings to go on’.  He even went as far, behind closed doors in the Air Ministry, as to concede that the number of very long-range aircraft forces in Coastal Command was unacceptable ‘on any standards’ and that ‘I do not think the Admiralty requirements are at all unreasonable.’  He believed it was right to lend the Lancasters, though in his defence he pointed out that the two squadron loan was ‘very short’ of the Navy’s initial demands and that failing to agree might have led to more being transferred.​[89]​  Portal, however, remained immoveable and insisted that the aircraft envisaged might at best sink five U-boats and damage a dozen more or could instead drop 800 tons of bombs on Germany and lay 600 mines.  (It is an extraordinary indication of how he continued to overstate the impact of bombing that he rated dropping 800 tons of bombs on Germany higher than sinking five U-boats and putting a dozen more out of action.)  They would make a greater contribution to the war effort by remaining in Bomber Command; ‘I am so strongly convinced of this that I regard the loss of these two squadrons to Bomber Command as unacceptable.’  His counter-offer was that some training squadrons (albeit without any maritime training) might conduct some flights in the desired patrol zone and an unspecified number of Lancasters might be switched from mining to anti-submarine operations.  Reconnaissance would be conducted by Bomber Command aircraft as needed.​[90]​

The Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that ‘the Navy is already stretched to the utmost and that the shipping losses are dangerously high’, which would take up much Allied production, harm the ability to reinforce and supply forces overseas and ‘also hamper dangerously our future strategy’.  Nevertheless, they went along with this minimal and grudging concession; ​[91]​ once again, the Admiralty was unwilling or unable to prevent the Air Staff putting its preferences first.  For Harris, even such marginal reallocations as Portal was prepared to concede were too much to bear.  In a long paper written for the War Cabinet, he referred to those ‘who advocate the breaking-up of Bomber Command for the purpose of adding strength to Coastal and Army Co-operation Commands’, comparing them to amateur politicians who would divide the national wealth among the entire population, giving each person a tiny sum while wrecking the overall economy.​[92]​  This was a rather extreme interpretation of a fairly modest redistribution of long-range aircraft.

This small promised reallocation was, once again, not fulfilled and the Admiralty returned to the issue in October.  It pointed out that ‘the minimum target figures of shore-based aircraft agreed with the Air Ministry for operations over the sea will only be met to the extent of 75 per cent by 1st November 1942’.  The result was that in the six months to August, the average loss of merchant shipping per month was 685,000 tons, resulting in a waste of labour and resources in the ships and their cargoes, a shortage of tankers, the loss of trained merchant seamen and lower morale for the survivors.  The lack of air support was also limiting the ability of the Navy to undertake offensive operations as well as halting convoys and holding up overseas reinforcements, and restricting the ability to interfere with enemy sea communications.  Priorities for air production which stood while Allied air power was inferior to the enemy should be reassessed now that this was no longer the case.  The First Lord therefore sought a greater proportion of the national effort for naval production, including making up arrears in production for the Fleet Air Arm, not least new aircraft to reduce the proportion of obsolescent aircraft on carriers.  He also recommended that more long-range aircraft should be committed to maritime operations, including types suitable for anti-shipping work, and that shore-based maritime aircraft should ‘have priority second only to the needs of the fighter defence of the United Kingdom’.​[93]​  This was a fairly modest proposal; meeting the backlog in previously agreed numbers for the Fleet Air Arm and temporarily raising the priority of Coastal Command above that of Bomber Command in order to meet the long-standing shortfall compared to what had been agreed, as well as shifting some resources into naval production.

Just like Harris in relation to the previous proposal, Slessor as ACAS (Policy) reacted in an extreme fashion – which perhaps suggests that he had learned the lesson from having his wings clipped after his compromise of a few months before.  He strongly opposed the suggestion, characterising the Admiralty’s attitude as ‘their requirements must invariably be met as a matter of first priority and without regard for any other commitments’; the recommendations of the paper ‘could be summarised in one sentence “Never mind Bomber Command – give all the long-range bombers to Coastal”’.​[94]​  Just like Harris before him, Slessor was robustly objecting to an argument that no one was actually making, a ridiculous straw man.  The Admiralty was not advocating the abolition of Bomber Command, nor calling for the termination of the strategic bombing campaign nor even for a temporary halt, nor demanding huge chunks of the long-range bomber force be moved over to Coastal.  What was sought was an increase in the number of long-range aircraft in Coastal Command at the expense of a relatively far smaller slowing of the pace of expansion of Bomber Command; that is, of the increasing resources pouring into the RAF, a little more than planned should go to Coastal Command.  Indeed, the attitude Slessor described of ‘their requirements must invariably be met as a matter of first priority and without regard for any other commitments’ would be a more accurate description of the approach of the Air Ministry than that of the Admiralty.

The remarkable hyperbole of the reaction to this proposal suggests that there had been something of a loss of perspective in parts of the Air Ministry to the extent that advocating the transfer of a few aircraft from one RAF Command to another was interpreted as an existential threat.  The Admiralty was not questioning whether there should be a strategic bombing campaign.  There was an acceptance that it had a central role in British strategy, albeit not one that would be decisive on its own as some of the senior airmen believed.  As a note discussing papers by Trenchard and Harris put it: ‘In the Admiralty’s view the bombing of Germany is analogous to the blockade.  Both contribute considerably to the undermining of the enemy’s resources and morale, and thereby weaken the fighting power of his armed forces; but neither of them are substitutes for their defeat but only contributions thereto.’​[95]​  They were not trying to stop the bombing offensive but rather were questioning the extent of the priority it was receiving and the cost that resulted in terms of Britain’s ability to conduct other important campaigns.  They were seeking not an end to strategic bombing but a modest rebalancing of resources towards other needs.  There were times of particular crisis when it would have been entirely sensible for the air offensive to continue but to be temporarily put in second place behind ensuring victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, which was necessary first for Britain’s survival and then for any ‘offensive’ operations, including strategic bombing.  It is a huge leap to move from this contention to saying that there should be no strategic air offensive but this sort of proposal, frequently railed against by the Air Staff, was pure fiction and not one that the Admiralty ever made.  Another internal Admiralty paper from 1942 argued for some long-range aircraft to be released from Bomber Command but was quite clear that the forces moved would be small: ‘This should mean only a reduction in the scale of the bombing offensive.  It is not suggested that there should be any relaxation of a continued bombing offensive.’​[96]​

Even a modest reduction was too much to ask.  The Air Staff continued to insist that the best way that the RAF could contribute to the Battle of the Atlantic was to attack German industrial power, which would destroy the factories that built components for U-boats and the yards that assembled them.  Typical of this approach was Harris: ‘…Bomber Command attacks the sources of all Naval power, rather than the fringes of the one type of enemy Naval operation which obviously menaces us – the submarine.’​[97]​  There were two problems with this approach.  First, at least up until early 1943, the strategic air offensive did little or nothing to stem the flow of U-boats into the German Navy.  In the middle of 1941, Churchill for a while attached absolute priority to the Battle of the Atlantic (covered in more detail below).   The Air Staff chafed against this but did carry out some attacks on bases and yards.  This effort was ineffective: ‘Post-war records make it clear that, in fact, it had a negligible effect on the large number of U-boats now building.’​[98]​  In late 1942 an Admiralty paper noted that even on Harris’ own evidence – ‘some of it of the flimsiest character’ – out of 360 U-boats completed and 260 building, only ‘22 boats have been directly affected’ by strategic bombing.​[99]​  The official historians of the strategic air campaign conclude that from 1941 to January 1943: ‘Submarine construction continued to rise and the effect of the large number of attacks on the ports concerned was negligible.  That this was the case was realised by MEW [the Ministry of Economic Warfare], whose estimates of the number of submarines built in the year and the gradual rise of the monthly average was very accurate.  The claim of Bomber Command that it could do more to help the Battle of the Atlantic by bombing submarine construction yards rather than the ports from which they set out was not substantiated.’  In other words, not only was Bomber Command failing to damage U-boat production but the British government knew it to be failing.​[100]​  This represents a devastating indictment of RAF policy from a well informed and sympathetic source.

The second problem was that available evidence strongly suggested the allocation of resources should have been different.  Operational analysis, which played an important role in the Battle of the Atlantic, showed that a very-long range aircraft operating with convoys could save at least half a dozen merchant ships during its operational lifetime; alternatively, if used instead over Germany, it could drop less than 100 tons of bombs on Berlin.  As Professor P.M.S. Blackett concluded, ‘No-one would dispute that the saving of six merchant vessels and their crews and cargoes was of incomparably more value to the Allied war effort than the killing of some two dozen enemy civilians, the destruction of a number of houses, and a certain very small effect on production.’​[101]​  In this respect, of course, he was quite wrong; Portal, Harris, Trenchard, Slessor and all too often Churchill did dispute this.

‘Hard and fast priorities unintelligently interpreted’​[102]​

By the summer of 1943, the worst period of crisis in the Battle of the Atlantic had passed and the situation was improving markedly.  In part, the Allies’ ever growing productive capacity meant that a relative bounty of resources could resolve many strategic dilemmas.  More long-range aircraft slowly yet steadily became available – suggesting what might have been achieved earlier.  This, together with the crucial advent of escort carriers finally closed the mid-Atlantic air gap.  The results achieved by the bombing campaign also improved with new navigation aids, greater experience and better techniques.  This is not to argue that the claims of the airmen to be able to win the war alone could ever have been achieved – much of the great eventual effect of strategic bombing was realised as it became, against the determined resistance of Harris and other such purists, ever more closely tied into an avowedly all-arms strategy that explicitly saw bombing as assisting the opposed invasion of the continent, not making it unnecessary.  However, the fact that the Chiefs of Staff did not adequately resolve the problem of the provision of air support for the war at sea during the critical period, between 1940 and early 1943, was a glaring failure of the system which needlessly lengthened the period of crisis in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Fully accounting for this failure is beyond the scope of this article but some contributing causes can be identified.  One major factor was the intransigence and dogmatism displayed by Portal.  According to his biographer, Portal gave a speech at the Mansion House in London in June 1946, where referring to the Chiefs of Staff, he asserted that ‘there was no axe-grinding by any particular service’.​[103]​  His reluctance to countenance any reduction in the bombing of Germany regardless of the air power needs of his fellow Chiefs suggests that he might have been flattering himself a little.  Portal put his undoubtedly formidable intellectual and bureaucratic talents solidly behind the Air Ministry’s preoccupation with the strategic bombing campaign, which was not necessarily in the best interests of the country or even the RAF.  Portal was by no means the worst case in the Air Staff of a prisoner to dogma: later in the war he would strongly back the use of Bomber Command in support Operation Overlord.​[104]​  He was criticised for this after the war by some former colleagues, including Slessor.​[105]​  Nevertheless, during the critical period up to the spring of 1943, he repeatedly refused to meet the needs of the war at sea in favour of persisting with the strategic air offensive, which he and the government were well aware was failing to deliver on its promises.

Why was the implacable Portal allowed to get away with so much?  Part of the explanation must be the reasonable reluctance of the other Chiefs of Staff to take on the bitter conflict that would have been necessary to prise more aircraft from the Air Staff for the war at sea.  There were good reasons to wish the usually collegiate working of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to continue, not least because the Chiefs were often drawn together by the common need to resist some of Churchill’s more colourful brainwaves.  The understandable tendency of the Chiefs to seek consensus and compromise allowed those with the most extreme opinions to stick to their views.  It could also manifest itself in a lack of clarity.  Thus, Portal could accept that absolute priority should go to the bomber force only after ‘the minimum force of aircraft (e.g. fighter, general reconnaissance, Fleet Air Arm, etc.) essential for our security has been provided’;​[106]​ yet as time would prove, he and his counterparts would have a very different idea of just what would constitute this ‘minimum’.  The Chiefs of Staff as a body could agree that offensive bombing against transportation and morale should be conducted, ‘Subject therefore to the requirements of security (including of course the Battle of the Atlantic)’​[107]​ but again, this apparent consensus masked fundamental disagreements.

It is also hard to avoid the conclusion that Pound’s poor and declining health made him less able and willing to take on Portal than perhaps he should have been.​[108]​  As Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Brooke noted Pound’s frequent ineffectiveness in meetings: ‘I always felt nervous lest the naval aspect of our problems should not be adequately represented owing to his being so often asleep’.​[109]​  The saga of the failure to devote the necessary resources to the war at sea suggests that this was indeed the case and a different First Sea Lord might have offered Portal a more robust challenge.

The entrenched position of Portal and the unwillingness and inability of the other Chiefs of Staff to confront him meant that this vital matter was allowed to fester while the Air Staff resisted, delayed and dismissed attempts to reallocate resources in favour of waging what amounted at times to its own private war.  Given that the Air Ministry failed to behave in a very fraternal fashion over the Battle for the Atlantic, the resolution should have come from its political masters.  When the Chiefs of Staff cannot agree on such issues – which are by any standard genuinely complicated – then the War Cabinet needs to step in and make a decision on priorities.  That this was not done is an indictment of the government and to a considerable extent of the Prime Minister, not least since he had also taken on the role of Minister of Defence.  Churchill’s approach to this matter was characterised by a maddening inconsistency.  As First Lord of the Admiralty, he had stressed the importance of air power for the Navy, for reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare, arguing that the needs of the Fleet Air Arm ‘though small comparatively, cannot cede priority in any respect.’​[110]​  He wrote to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that he agreed that ‘Air Power stand foremost in our requirements, and indeed I sometimes think that it may be the ultimate path by which victory will be gained’.  However, he continued, the Air Ministry ‘seems to peg out vast and vague claims, which are not at present substantiated, and which, if accorded absolute priority, would overlay other indispensable forms of war effort.’​[111]​  This was precisely what would happen when he was later in a position to prevent it.

As Prime Minister Churchill proved unable to resist the Air Ministry’s extravagant claims on behalf of air power; whilst at times expressing scepticism as a result of their failure to realise these claims in practice, he tended to favour the strategic air offensive over other campaigns.​[112]​  Yet his support did not always preclude pushing other competing calls on resources.  One of the most egregious examples of this is a memorandum he wrote in September 1940: ‘The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it.  Therefore our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery in the air.  The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory…  In no other way at present visible can we hope to overcome the immense military power of Germany…  The Air Force and its action on the larger scale must therefore, subject to what is said later, claim the first place over the Navy or the Army.’  So, bombing should have priority but not at the expense of all other activities.  The same memorandum ordered the Navy to plan ‘aggressive schemes of war’ against enemy coasts; ‘The production of anti-U-boat craft must proceed at the maximum until further orders…  The decision to raise the Army to a strength of 55 divisions as rapidly as possible does not seem to require any reconsideration…  Intense efforts must be made to complete the equipment of our Army at home and of our Army in the Middle East…  We must expect to fight in Egypt and the Soudan, in Turkey, Syria or Palestine, and possibly in Iraq and Persia.’  Also, radar and associated scientific developments must be regarded as ‘ranking in priority with the Air Force’.​[113]​  He was apparently unaware of the old saying that if everything is a priority, then nothing is.

The problem was not any reluctance to set priorities; on the contrary, they were set too many times in a contradictory fashion and difficult issues were shirked rather than give a clear lead that would be unacceptable to one of the services.  What is the most pressing concern for strategy will naturally change frequently over the course of a war lasting nearly six years, especially one characterised by so many ebbs and flows of fortune.  It is to be expected that priorities will evolve.  However, the frequency with which priorities changed is nonetheless startling.

At times Churchill did, it is true, give the maritime campaign a prominent place in his rhetoric; however, his record of following this through into policy decisions and prioritisation was quite abysmal.  After the war, he famously wrote: ‘The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril…  our life-line, even across the broad oceans, and especially in the entrances to the Island, was endangered.  I was even more anxious about this battle than I had been about the glorious air fight called the Battle of Britain.’​[114]​  This ringing retrospective declaration of concern was not at all a reflection of his actual policy during the war.  There was little ‘glorious’ about the campaign against the U-boats – in stark contrast to the well publicised activities of Bomber Command (never knowingly undersold) and the even more extravagant promises of future achievement that were never fulfilled.  Again, according to his memoirs, ‘this mortal danger to our life-lines gnawed my bowels’, so in March 1941 he formally proclaimed ‘the Battle of the Atlantic’, instituted the ‘Battle of the Atlantic Committee’ and issued his ‘Battle of the Atlantic Directive’.  Offensive action was to be taken against the U-boats and land-based aircraft supporting them, as well as their bases; ‘extreme’ priority should go to ships capable of launching fighters, Coastal Command should get the support of Fighter and Bomber Commands and labour would be reallocated to repair and building of merchant shipping, among other measures.​[115]​

The directive issued by the RAF to Bomber Command putting the Prime Minister’s instructions into practice demonstrates the limited impact of such worthy statements.​[116]​  Churchill’s directive suggested that Britain ‘should’ be able to defeat the threat in four months; the Air Ministry directive putting his instructions into effect interpreted this conveniently to mean that the shift in effort would only last for four months.  It also stated that operations should be directed against the mandated targets ‘when circumstances permit’ while pointing out that this ‘does not entirely exclude attacks on the primary objectives’, to which some effort should still be devoted; moreover, clinging to the overall ideology, priority was to be given not to those targets that would most influence the Battle of the Atlantic, but rather to ‘those in Germany which lie in congested areas where the greatest moral effect is likely to result’.​[117]​  The target list included not only the operational bases of the submarines and U-boats, but also targets that would only have at best an eventual and indirect effect, hardly ameliorating the current crisis, such as U-boat construction yards as well as engine and aircraft factories; a subsequent directive watered down the focus on naval targets even further, adding submarine battery and engine factories in the Ruhr and in Southern Germany – the latter, it was emphasised, ‘are suitable as area objectives and their attack should have high morale value.’​[118]​  Clearly there is a need for some form of transmission mechanism to put prime ministerial intentions into operational orders, but a more egregious case of the phenomenon of ‘consent and evade’ would be difficult to find.​[119]​

Four months to the day from the first directive, Bomber Command was once again ordered ‘to direct the main effort of the bombing force, until further instructions, towards dislocating the German transportation system and to destroying the morale of the civil population as a whole and of the industrial workers in particular’, though important naval units and submarine building yards and based were still to be ‘attacked periodically’.​[120]​  It could hardly be argued that by July 1941, the crisis in the Battle of the Atlantic had passed yet as so often, Churchill did not follow through on his earlier words.

It is therefore easy to exaggerate the significance of the March 1941 ‘Battle of the Atlantic’ directive.  First, it was only one of a stream of directives to Bomber Command which were often mutually contradictory and swiftly superseded.  Second (assisted by the multiple directives) there was always room for interpretation in how the directive was put into practice – and here there was a frequent tendency to violate the spirit and even the letter of what had been requested.  Exacerbating this was the Prime Ministerial failure to follow through with such worthy expressions of intent as his attention shifted elsewhere, so even the grudging and partial shift of effort that the RAF was prepared to concede was soon reversed.  In this case, as so often, Churchill proved unwilling or unable to resist the seductively ambitious claims of the bomber barons.

This directive was by no means the only instance of apparent Prime Ministerial reverses of course.  In October 1940, Churchill described the disabling of the Bismarck and the Tirpitz as the ‘greatest prize open to Bomber Command.’​[121]​  In December 1940, he conferred on Coastal Command ‘supreme priority.  The bombing of Germany took second place.  All suitable machines, pilots, and material must be concentrated upon our counter-offensive’.​[122]​   Yet by July 1941 he was deploring ‘the fact that the Liberators received from America had been allocated to Coastal Command; now was the time for every heavy bomber to concentrate on Germany’.​[123]​  At the beginning of September 1941, he determined that greater efforts should be devoted to the production of heavy and medium bombers and ordered that the RAF expansion plan should be revised accordingly, accepting that to achieve this it ‘may be necessary to slow up the Admiralty programme or to reduce the flow of equipment to the Army’.​[124]​  Yet later that same month, a visit to the carrier HMS Indomitable prompted him to instruct the Chiefs of Staff ‘that only the finest aeroplanes that can do the work go into all aircraft carriers… The aircraft carriers should have supreme priority in the quality and character of suitable types’, and in December the Defence Committee (Supply) that he chaired agreed the highest priority should go to fighters for armoured carriers, after a complaint from the First Lord that the Fleet Air Arm was still equipped with obsolescent aircraft types.​[125]​  Later that month, he stressed the importance of carriers for the Allied campaign in the Pacific, and maintained that they should have priority even though this ‘will involve a retardation in the full-scale bombing offensive against Germany…  Our joint programme may be late, but it will all come along.  And meanwhile, the German cities and other targets will not disappear.  While every effort must be made to speed up the rate of bomb discharge upon Germany until the great scales prescribed for 1943 and 1944 are reached, nevertheless we may be forced by other needs to face a retardation in our schedules.’​[126]​  January 1942 saw him put strategic bombing behind aircraft for carriers: ‘Having regard to the fact that the bombing offensive is necessarily a matter of degree and that the targets cannot be moved away, it would be right to assign priority to the fighter and torpedo-carrying aircraft required for the numerous carriers and improvised carriers which are available or must be brought into existence.’​[127]​  Yet in late 1942, the Fleet Air Arm was still equipped with insufficient numbers of poor-performance fighters and the Admiralty believed that the Fleet Air Arm had been ‘crowded out by Bomber and other RAF requirements… there is no doubt that priority has NOT been given to the production of up-to-date aircraft, either for Coastal Command or Fleet Air Arm, and consequently neither of these forces is properly equipped.’​[128]​  Which had the higher priority, bombers for the strategic offensive or fighters for the Fleet Air Arm?  A Prime Ministerial memorandum in December 1942 explained the situation.  ‘The bombing offensive over Germany and Italy must be regarded as our prime effort in the Air’, while providing the Fleet Air Arm with ‘highest grade fighter aircraft…  remains the paramount object, and the highest priority should continue to be given to the supply of the best fighter types to the carriers.’​[129]​  So, the one is the ‘prime effort’ while the other is ‘paramount object… the highest priority.’  In his own account of the war, Churchill resonantly declared, ‘The Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war.  Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere, on land, at sea, or in the air, depended on its outcome’.​[130]​  Yet his actual policy and his dizzying inconsistency on the issue suggests that often during the war, he did forget this reality just as the Air Staff did.

Brooke, his closest collaborator, was well aware of this feature of Churchill’s personality.  In May 1943, the long suffering CIGS wrote that Churchill: ‘Thinks one thing at one moment and then another at another moment.  At times the war may be won by bombing and all sacrificed to it’, while at other times he favoured fighting on the continent, or in the Mediterranean, Italy, the Balkans, or Norway; ‘But more often than all he wants to carry out ALL operations simultaneously irrespective of shortages of shipping!’​[131]​  Perhaps the most memorable description of Churchill in Brooke’s diaries appears in January 1944: ‘In all his plans he lives from hand to mouth.  He can never grasp a whole plan, either in its width (i.e. all fronts) or its depth (long term projects).  His method is entirely opportunist, gathering one flower here another there!’  This depicts accurately the way in which he would leap from one project to another, throwing around priority labels repeatedly, even incontinently.  One field of endeavour would be lifted to the heights of importance only for another to follow it – or should that be, to top it? – with the same, or even worse, a different label.  His restless creativity was not matched by a facility for thinking things through and balancing them against each other, and while he sometimes delved down into topics of extraordinarily narrow detail,​[132]​ he frequently lacked attention to detail.





The period from 1940 to early 1943 saw bitter disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic.  The Admiralty had by now embraced the modern reality that sea power could only be adequately exercised by a combination of naval and air power and repeatedly sought the air support that they required.  The Air Ministry, however, repeatedly refused to concede that the needs of the Battle of the Atlantic were sufficiently pressing to justify any reduction in the scale of the strategic air offensive.  They genuinely believed that it could either win the war or leave the land forces with a task little harder than occupation, and hence naturally pushed it hard.  The dispute between the two was not resolved by a compromise reached by the participants or an allocation imposed by the government; rather it was submerged by the rising tide of Allied materiel.

This article has argued that the Air Ministry were in the wrong in this long drawn-out debate.  This was in large part due to a contradiction in RAF philosophy: the insistence that all air power should be unified under the central control of a single service works only to the extent that the requirements of the other services are, if not fully met then at least reasonably addressed.  The superimposition of a narrow and dogmatic fixation on strategic bombing as the way to win the war meant that the Air Staff was in effect declining to provide the air power that the other services freely acknowledged they needed, on the grounds that the RAF had better things to do with it.  The RAF maintained that the other services would not be able to operate without air power, insisted that they should be its only providers, and then refused to meet this responsibility.  Small wonder that the Navy and the Army found this unsatisfactory and periodically sought to bring a proportion of British air power under their own control.  In the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, the Air Staff – driven by a brash, young ideology – refused to concede the evident, desperate needs of a campaign that was essential for Britain’s survival and for any other military operations, and focussed instead on their favoured theory that was at the time not only unproven but contradicted by all the available evidence.  What was at issue was not – despite the hysterical reaction of the bomber barons – an end to or even a significant reduction in the bomber offensive, but rather a relatively small reallocation of resources.  This case applied in particular to very-long range aircraft where, as was pointed out at the time, the losses of one night could have had a decisive effect on the campaign against the U-boats.​[135]​  

The strategic bombing campaign did make a significant contribution to the Allied victory.  However, this was very much less than had been promised and was merely a consolation prize for the bomber barons as for the air theorists, who believed it could win the war on its own, and who translated this blind faith into policy, resisting any deviation from it.  Moreover this impact came at an enormous cost in resources and manpower.  Once it became clear that strategic bombing would not and could not win the war alone, let alone quickly, then it became one line of operation among several.  It thereby lost its claim to automatic first and over-riding priority, and its requirements would have to be balanced against those of other campaigns and operations.  Some proportion of the resources devoted to the strategic bombing of Germany, which had distinctly modest results during the years in question, would have been better allocated to an increased provision of long-range reconnaissance aircraft, fighters and torpedo bombers to Coastal Command.  In this way, the enormous contribution of air power to the Allied victory could have been still greater.

Even those who are not persuaded by this argument might acknowledge two other conclusions that emerge.  First, just as earlier quarrels had paved the way for them, the prolonged and bitter disputes of the wartime years left a legacy of mistrust and suspicion that carried over into the postwar years.  This continuity did not apply only to a general and mutual prickliness between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry; the specific issues that were the subject of the on-going disputes were remarkably similar to those of the war, including the extent to which British strategy could and should rely on strategic bombing versus the need to protect sea communications, and the strength and (to a far greater extent than during the war) the control of Coastal Command.  The similarity of the issues dividing the Navy and the RAF in the early 1940s and in the early 1950s was truly remarkable.  Even such an enormously significant technological innovation as the introduction of atomic weapons had a strangely minor effect on the relationship, becoming simply one more element in an on-going debate rather than igniting a whole new one.​[136]​
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